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Abstract—With the deployment of online monitoring systems in
distribution networks, massive amounts of data collected through
them contains rich information on the operating states of the
networks. By leveraging the data, an unsupervised approach
based on bidirectional generative adversarial networks (BiGANs)
is proposed for operational risk assessment in distribution
networks in this paper. The approach includes two stages: (1)
adversarial feature learning. The most representative features
are extracted from the online monitoring data and a statistical
index Nφ is calculated for the features, during which we make no
assumptions or simplifications on the real data. (2) operational
risk assessment. The confidence level 1 − α for the population
mean of the standardized Nφ is combined with the operational
risk levels which are divided into emergency, high risk, preventive
and normal, and the p value for each data point is calculated
and compared with α
2
to determine the risk levels. The proposed
approach is capable of discovering the latent structure of the
real data and providing more accurate assessment result. The
synthetic data is employed to illustrate the selection of parameters
involved in the proposed approach. Case studies on the real-world
online monitoring data validate the effectiveness and advantages
of the proposed approach in risk assessment.
Index Terms—operational risk assessment, distribution net-
works, online monitoring data, bidirectional generative adver-
sarial networks (BiGANs), unsupervised approach
I. INTRODUCTION
THE operational risk assessment is a fundamental task indistribution networks, which can help realize situation
awareness of the network and offer support on the safety
analysis and control decision. One main factor that influ-
ences the operational risks are faults or fluctuations caused
by anomalies in the distribution network. These anomalies
may present intermittent, asymmetric, and sporadic spikes,
which are random in magnitude and could involve sporadic
bursts as well, and exhibit complex, nonlinear, and dynamic
characteristics [1]. Additionally, with numerous branch lines
and changeable network topology, it is questionable for the
This work was partly supported by National Key R & D Program of No.
2018YFF0214705, NSF of China No. 61571296, (US) NSF Grant No. CNS-
1619250 and NSF of China No. 51677072.
1 Department of Electrical Engineering,Center for Big Data and Ar-
tificial Intelligence, State Energy Smart Grid Research and Develop-
ment Center, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200240, China. (e-
mail: dugushixin@sjtu.edu.cn; rcqiu@sjtu.edu.cn; mitiebin@foxmail.com;
hexing hx@126.com)
2 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,Tennessee Techno-
logical University, Cookeville, TN 38505, USA. (e-mail:rqiu@tntech.edu)
3 State Key Laboratory of Alternate Electrical Power Systems with Re-
newable Energy Sources, North China Electric Power University, Baoding
071003, China. (e-mail: yonglipw@163.com)
traditional model-based approaches to fully and accurately
detect the anomalies in the distribution network, because they
are usually based on certain assumptions or simplifications.
In recent years, there have been significant deployments
of online monitoring systems in distribution networks and a
large amount of data is collected through them. The massive
data contains rich information on the operating state of the
distribution network. In order to leverage the data, many
advanced analytics are developed. For example, in [2], a PCA-
based approach is proposed to reduce the dimensionality of
phasor-measurement-unit (PMU) data, whose result is utilized
to detect early events in the network. In [3], based on
wavelet energy spectrum entropy decomposition of disturbance
waveforms, characteristic features are extracted to detect and
classify faults in a distribution network. In [4], by using
multi-time-instant synchrophasor data, a density-based outlier
detection approach is used to detect low-quality synchrophasor
measurements. In [5], by computing parallel synchrophasor-
based state estimators, a real-time fault detection and faulted
line identification methodology is proposed. In [6], a method
using time-frequency analysis is proposed for feature extrac-
tion, and a classifier is trained by those extracted features. In
[7], based on the multiple high dimensional covariance matrix
test theory, a statistically-based anomaly detection algorithm
is proposed for streaming PMU data.
Reviewing the current efforts on anomaly detection by using
online monitoring data, two main weaknesses exist: 1) they
rely on a prior parametric model of the monitoring data, which
are usually based on certain assumptions and simplifications.
2) they often use simple features calculated through the time-
series monitoring data, such as the mean, variance, spectrum,
high moments, etc. For the methods based on pre-designed
parametric models, they are sensitive to parameter values and
it is not easy to find the optional parameters to capture the
essential features for each data segment. Therefore, false alarm
can easily happen. While for the statistically-based methods,
simple statistical features often are not well generalized in
most cases and they are susceptible to random fluctuations,
which makes it impossible to detect the latent anomalies.
Generative adversarial nets(GANs) are first proposed by
Goodfellow in 2014 [8], overcoming the difficulties of ap-
proximating many intractable probabilistic computations and
leveraging the benefits of piecewise linear units in deep gener-
ative models. It trains a generator to automatically capture the
distribution of the sample data from simple latent distributions,
and a discriminator to distinguish between real and generated
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2samples. Compared with the probability distributions calcu-
lated by traditional techniques, the automatically captured
ones can better depict the rich structure information of the
arbitrarily complex data. However, the existing GANs have
no function of projecting the generated data back into the
latent space, which makes it impossible to use those latent
feature representations for auxiliary problems. In view of
this occasion, Donahue propose an improved framework of
GANs in 2016, bidirectional generative adversarial networks
(BiGANs)[9]. BiGANs have solved the problem of inaccessi-
ble feature representations by adding an encoder in the original
framework of GANs. It is a robust and highly generative
feature learning approach for arbitrarily complex data, making
no assumptions or simplifications on the data.
In this paper, we propose a new unsupervised approach for
the operational risk assessment in distribution networks. It can
automatically learn the most representative features from the
input data in an adversarial way by using BiGANs. Based
on the extracted features, a statistical index Nφ is defined
and calculated to indicate the data behavior. Furthermore, to
quantify the operational risks of feeder lines in the distribution
network, the risk levels are classified into emergency, high
risk, preventive and normal, and they are combined with the
confidence level 1−α for the population mean of the standard
Nφ. By comparing the p value for each data point of the
standard Nφ with the intervals of α2 , the operational risks of
the feeder lines can be judged intuitively. The main advantages
of the proposed approach are summarized as follows: 1) It
is a purely data-driven approach without requiring too much
prior knowledge on the complex topology of the distribution
network, which eliminates the potential detection errors caused
by inaccurate network information. 2) It is an unsupervised
learning approach requiring no anomaly labels or records,
which solves the label lack or inaccuracy problem in the
distribution network. 3) It automatically learns features from
the online monitoring data in the distribution network, which
makes it possible for detecting the latent anomalies. Because
the learned features are more powerful in representing the real
data than artificially designed ones. 4) It is suitable for both
online and offline analysis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the proposed BiGANs-based anomaly detection
algorithm, i.e., data preparing and normalization, adversar-
ial feature learning, and anomaly detection. In section III,
spatio-temporal matrices are formulated by using the online
monitoring data in distribution networks and specific steps
of operational risk assessment are given. In section IV, the
synthetic data from IEEE 118-bus system are used to illustrate
the selection of parameters involved in the approach, and the
real-world online monitoring data in a distribution network
are used to validate the effectiveness and advantages of the
proposed approach. Conclusions are presented in section V.
II. BIGANS-BASED ANOMALY DETECTION
In this section, the BiGANs-based anomaly detection algo-
rithm is introduced. First, the multi-dimensional time series
data are partitioned into a series of segments in chrono-
logical order. The main idea is that BiGANs are utilized
Fig. 1. Pipeline for the vectorization of data matrix.
to automatically learn the most representative features from
the data segments without making any prior assumptions
or simplifications. Based on the extracted features for each
data segment, a statistical index is calculated to indicate
the data behaviour. The designed algorithm offers an end-
to-end solution for anomaly detection and specific steps are
characterized as below.
A. Data Preparing and Normalization
Assume there are P -dimensional measurements (such as
voltage measurements from P sensors installed on one feeder
line) (d1, d2, ..., dP ) ∈ RP . At the sampling time tj , the
P−dimensional measurements can be formulated as a column
vector d(tj) = (d1, d2, ..., dP )H . For a series of time T ,
by arranging these vectors in chronological order, a spatio-
temporal data matrix D ∈ RP×T is obtained.
With a P×Nw (Nw ≤ T ) window moving on D at the step
size Ns, a series of data segments are generated. For example,
at the sampling time tj , the generated data segment is
D(tj) = (d(tj−Nw+1),d(tj−Nw+2), · · · ,d(tj)), (1)
where d(tk) = (d1, d2, · · · , dP )H (tj−Nw+1 ≤ tk ≤ tj) is
the sampling data at time tk. For the data segment at the
sampling time tj , we reshape it into a column vector denoted
as xtj ∈ RPNw×1. Thus, the spatio-temporal data matrix is re-
formulated as D = [x(tNw);x(tNw+Ns);x(tNw+2×Ns); · · · ],
which is shown in Figure 1. To reduce the calculation error
and improve the convergence speed of training BiGANs in the
subsequent feature learning process, we normalize x into x˜ by
x˜i =
xi −min(x)
max(x)−min(x) , (2)
where x˜i(i = 1, 2, · · · , PNw) is the normalized value in
the range [0, 1], min(x) and max(x) respectively denote the
minimum and maximum value of x.
B. Adversarial Feature Learning
BiGANs, train a generative model G to capture the distri-
bution of the sample data, a discriminative model D to distin-
guish the real samples from the generated ones as accurately
as possible, and an encoding model E to project sample data
back into the latent space. Feature representations learned by
3Fig. 2. The framework of BiGANs.
the encoding model can depict the rich structure information
of the sample data well, which can be used for other auxiliary
problems. The framework of BiGANs is shown in Figure 2.
The generative model G, also called generator, is composed
of multi-layer networks. For convenience, we assume it’s a
three-layer network, i.e., the input layer, one hidden layer and
the output layer. Data transition from the input layer to the
output layer can be denoted as in Equation (3) and (4).
hg = Sh(Whz + bh), (3)
G(z) = Sg(Wghg + bg), (4)
where z is the input data sampled from a simple latent
distribution (gaussian, uniform, exponential, etc), hg is the
output of the hidden layer in G, Wh is the weight matrix
between the input layer and the hidden layer and Wg is
the weight matrix between the hidden layer and the output
layer. To avoid gradient vanishing in training multi-layer G,
as proposed in [10], Wh and Wg can be initialized by using
an uniform distribution
U [−
√
6√
Mi +Mi+1
,
√
6√
Mi +Mi+1
], (5)
where Mi and Mi+1 are the fan-in and fan-out of the units
in the i−th layer, U [x1, x2] denotes the uniform distribution
supported by x1 and x2. bh and bg are the bias vectors, which
can be initialized as small random values or 0. Sh and Sg
are activation functions, such as sigmoid function, or tanh
function, or rectified linear units (ReLu) first proposed in [11]
s(a) = max(0, a), (6)
or leaky ReLu (LReLu) proposed in [12][13]
s(a) = max(0, a)− β ×min(0, a). (7)
The parameter β in Equation (7) represents the slope of the
leak. Compared with ReLu, the LReLu can keep a small
gradient even though the unit is saturated. The output G(z) is
the generated sample, which has the same size with the real
data sample.
The encoding model E, also called encoder, is stacked with
multi-layer neural networks. Assuming an encoder with only
two-layer networks, i.e., the input layer and one hidden layer,
data transition from the input data x˜ to the hidden units is
called encoding, which is defined as
E(x˜) = Se(Wex˜ + be), (8)
where We is the weight matrix between the input layer and
the hidden layer, which can be initialized through Equation
(5). be is the bias vector initialized with small random values
or 0, and Se is the activation function. The output E(x˜) can
be considered as the feature representations of the real sample
data x˜ in the latent space.
The discriminative model D, called discriminator, is also
with multi-layer network structure, i.e., the input layer, multi-
ple hidden layers, and the output layer. It takes the combination
of the sample data and its latent features as the input y (i.e.,
y = [G(z), z] or y = [x˜, E(x˜)]), and outputs D(y) ∈ [0, 1] to
represent the probability that y is from the real sample rather
than the generated one. Considering a discriminator with three-
layer network, the discriminative process can be denoted as in
Equation (9) and (10).
hd = Sh(Why + bh), (9)
D(y) = Sd(Wdhd + bd), (10)
where Sh and Sd are the activation functions, Wh and Wd are
the weight matrices initialized through Equation (5), bh and
bd are the bias vectors initialized with small random values
or 0, and hd represents the output of the hidden layer in D.
Let pX be the distribution of the real data x for x ∈ ΦX
(e.g. data segments), pZ be the distribution of the sampled
data z in G for z ∈ ΦZ. In BiGANs, we train D to maximize
the probability of distinguishing the real samples from the
generated ones (i.e., maximizing logD(x˜, E(x˜))), train G to
minimize the probability of D making correct distinctions (i.e.,
minimizing log(1−D(G(z), z)), and simultaneously train E to
map the real data x˜ into the latent space of G (i.e., introducing
pE(z|x). Thus, the objective function of training BiGANs can
be defined as [9]
min
G,E
max
D
V (D,E,G), (11)
where
V (D,E,G) = Ex∼pX logD(x˜, E(x˜))
+ Ez∼pZ log(1−D(G(z), z))
. (12)
Considering the large number of parameters in BiGANs,
it is mandatory to introduce an regularization technique to
prevent the overfitting problem. Dropout, first proposed in
[14], addresses this problem by introducing randomness, i.e.,
dropping out the units in the hidden layers with a fixed
probability, such as 0.2. The minimax objective function in
Equation (11) can be optimized by using stochastic gradient
descent (SGD) based techniques, such as adaptive subgradient
(AdaGrad) method [15], root mean square prop (RMSprop)
alogithm [16], adaptive moment (Adam) estimation [17], etc.
Here, we choose Adam as the optimization algorithm, which
combines the advantages of AdaGrad and RMSprop, i.e.,
sparse gradients, online and non-stationary settings.
In practice, the objective function in Equation (11) may
not provide sufficient gradients for G to learn well, be-
cause D can clearly distinguish real sample from the gen-
erated one early in learning and this will easily lead to
log(1 − D(G(z), z)) to saturate. Therefore, we can train
G by maximizing log(D(G(z), z)) instead of minimizing
log(1 − D(G(z), z)). Theoretical results in [9] show the
objective function V (D,E,G) achieves its global minimum
4value − log 4 if and only if [G(z), z] and [x˜, E(x˜)] have the
same distribution (i.e., pG(z),z = px˜,E(x˜)).
The process of feature learning is training BiGANs, i.e., ob-
taining the optimal parameters θD, θE , θG by minimaximizing
the objective function in Equation (11). Here, θD, θE and θG
denote the corresponding parameters (i.e., W and b) in D,E
and G. When the network almost converges (i.e., G ≈ E−1),
the features output by the encoder can be considered as the
latent representations of the real data in the generator’s space,
which can be used for the subsequent anomaly detection task.
C. Anomaly Detection
Based on the features extracted through BiGANs for each
data segment, a high-dimensional statistical index for them is
calculated to indicate the data behavior. For example, at the
sampling time tj , the statistical index for the learned features
f(tj) is calculated as
Nφ (tj) =
∑
|fr(tj)|>median(|f(tj)|)
φ (|fr(tj)|), (13)
where fr(tj) ∈ f(tj). The test function φ(·) makes a linear or
nonlinear mapping for the features, which can be chebyshev
polynomial (CP), information entropy (IE), likelihood radio
function (LRF) or wasserstein distance (WD). Detailed infor-
mation about the test functions can be found in [18]. Nφ is
a complex function of the extracted features, which will be
further discussed in Section IV-A.
Considering random weight initialization and dropout en-
forces randomness during the adversarial feature learning,
the average value of the objective function in continuous
n iterations is calculated to judge whether terminating the
training. For example, for the i−th iteration, the average value
is calculated as
Vavg(D,E,G) =
1
n
i∑
l=i−n+1
Vl(D,E,G), (14)
where Vl(D,E,G) is the calculated objective function value
in the l−th (l = i−n+1, · · · , i) iteration, and Vavg(D,E,G)
denotes the average value for continuous n iterations. Here,
the simple averaging method in ensemble learning is used. For
each iteration, one network learning model is built and outputs
Vl(D,E,G). Thus, in continuous n iterations, the average
result Vavg(D,E,G) for n learning models is more accurate
in judging whether to terminate the training than simply using
the output Vi(D,E,G) in the last iteration, because the former
is more stable and reliable for reducing the error caused by
randomness and the risk of network falling into local optimum.
The procedure for anomaly detection based on BiGANs is
summarized as in Algorithm 1.
III. OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT USING ONLINE
MONITORING DATA IN DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
In this section, by using the online monitoring data, a new
unsupervised learning approach to assess the operational risks
of feeder lines in a distribution network is proposed. First,
a spatio-temporal data matrix is formulated for each feeder
Algorithm 1: The proposed BiGANs-based algorithm for anomaly detec-
tion. For D,G,E, the LReLu function is used as the activation function in
hidden layers and the tanh function as that in output layers, and Adam is
chosen as the optimization method, see Section II-B for details. m denotes
the number of steps applied to D and n is the number of iterations used
to calculate Vavg(D,E,G).
Input: The data segment {x(tNw+k×Ns )}(T−Nw)/Nsk=1 , the required
approximation error ε;
Output: The anomaly index Nφ;
1. For each data segment x do
2. Normalize x into x˜ according to Equation (2);
3. Initialize θD, θE , θG as illustrated in Section II-B;
4. For iteration i = 1, 2, 3, · · · do
5. For m steps do
6. Sample z(i,m) from a simple latent distribution;
7. Update D,E by descending their gradients:
∇θD [− logD(x˜, E(x˜))− log(1−D(G(z(i,m)), z(i,m)))]
∇θE [− logD(x˜, E(x˜))− log(1−D(G(z(i,m)), z(i,m)))]
End for
8. Sample z(i) from the same distribution as in step 6;
9. Update G by descending its gradient:
∇θG [− log(D(G(z(i)), z(i)))]
10. If i ≥ n do
11. Calculate Vavg(D,E,G) through Equation (14);
12. If |Vavg(D,E,G) + log 4| < ε do
13. ii = i;
14. Output the learned features {fl}iil=ii−n+1 calculated
through Equation (8);
15. Break;
End if
End if
End for
16. Calculate {Nφ,l}iil=ii−n+1 through Equation (13);
17. Calculate the statistical index for x:
Nφ = 1n
ii∑
l=ii−n+1
Nφ,l;
End for
Fig. 3. Circuitry topology diagram of partial distribution network.
line by using the online monitoring data, and the anomaly
index Nφ is calculated as illustrated in Section II. Then, by
combining the confidence level 1−α for the population mean
of the standardized Nφ, the operational risks are classified into
different levels with clear criterion defined. The specific steps
of the proposed approach are given and analyzed.
A. Formulation of Online Monitoring Data as Spatio-
Temporal Matrices
As illustrated in Figure 3, one feeder line in the partial
distribution network consists of branch lines and substations
with distribution transformers. On the low voltage side of
each distribution transformer, one online monitoring sensor is
installed, through which we can obtain multiple measurements,
such as three-phase voltages (i.e.,ua, ub, uc). Here, we choose
ua, ub, uc at the sampling time tj to formulate a data vector
d(tj) =
[
u
(1)
aj , u
(1)
bj , u
(1)
cj , · · · , u(m)aj , u(m)bj , u(m)cj
]H
, where m
denotes the number of sensors installed on the feeder. Let
5P = 3m, for a series of time T , we can obtain a spatio-
temporal data matrix D = [d(t1),d(t2), · · · ,d(tT )] ∈ RP×T .
It is noted that, by stacking the voltage measurements together,
the formulated spatio-temporal data matrix contains rich infor-
mation on the operating state of the feeder line.
B. Operational Risk Classification in Distribution Networks
The anomaly detection result can indicate the operating
states of the feeder lines in distribution networks. Here, it
is used as the basis for assessing the operational risks. For a
series of time T ′, the anomaly index Nφ for each data segment
is calculated, size of which is T
′
Ns
. We first standardize Nφ by
Nˆφ = Nφ − µ(Nφ)
σ(Nφ) , (15)
where µ(Nφ) and σ(Nφ) are the sample mean and sample
standard deviation of Nφ in a series of time T ′.
Considering the sample size T
′
Ns
is sometimes small, here,
Nˆφ is assumed to follow a student’s t-distribution with T ′Ns −
1 degrees of freedom, i.e., Nˆφ ∼ t( T ′Ns − 1). According to
the central limit theorem, the confidence level 1 − α for the
population mean µ of Nˆφ is defined as
1− α = P{µ(Nˆφ)− tα2
σ(Nˆφ)√
T ′
Ns
< µ < µ(Nˆφ) + tα2
σ(Nˆφ)√
T ′
Ns
},
(16)
where µ(Nˆφ) and σ(Nˆφ) are the sample mean and sample
standard deviation of Nˆφ with µ(Nˆφ) = 0 and σ(Nˆφ) = 1, tα2
is the upper α2 critical value for the t distribution with
T ′
Ns
−
1 degrees of freedom, and P{·} is the probability operator.
Thus, the confidence interval of level 1 − α is simplified as
[−tα
2
1√
T ′
Ns
, tα
2
1√
T ′
Ns
], and the p value for the interval critical
values is equal to α2 . For a given Nˆφ, the corresponding p
value can be obtained by the t distribution table. For example,
let Nˆφ = 2.650 and T ′Ns − 1 = 13, then the p value is 1%.
To further quantify the operational risks of feeder lines in
distribution networks, we classify the operational risk levels
into emergency, high risk, preventive and normal according
to the defined intervals of the confidence level 1 − α for the
population mean of Nˆφ, which is shown in Table I. Thus, for
a calculated Nˆφ, we can judge the operational risk level by
comparing the p value with the corresponding interval of α2 :
the smaller the p value, the higher the risk level.
TABLE I
THE CLASSIFICATION RESULTS OF OPERATIONAL RISK LEVELS.
Operational risk level Confidence level (1− α)
Emergency > 97.5%
High risk 95% < · · · ≤ 97.5%
Preventive 90% < · · · ≤ 95%
Normal ≤ 90%
Here, “emergency” means a feeder line operates in abnormal
state and serious faults may happen at any time. If one feeder
is diagnosed as in emergency state, it will be further analyzed.
“High risk” denotes a feeder line is of high risk in suffering
from faults, which deserves special attention. “Preventive”
means a feeder line operates in normal state, but it is not
safe and should be watched for a period of time. “Normal”
denotes a feeder line is in healthy state. By using Table I,
the operational risks of feeders are quantified, which offer
references for operators to make safety assessments.
C. The Operational Risk Assessment Approach in Distribution
Networks
Based on the research above, an unsupervised risk assess-
ment approach in distribution networks is proposed. The steps
of the approach are shown as follows.
Steps of the operational risk assessment in distribution networks
1. For each feeder, a spatio-temporal data matrix D ∈ RP×T is
formulated as illustrated in Section III-A.
2. Partition D into a series of data segments with a P ×Nw window
moving on it at a step size Ns.
3. For the data segment at the sampling time tj ,
3a) Reshape it into a column vector x(tj);
3b) Normalize x(tj) into x˜(tj) according to Equation (2);
3c) calculate the anomaly detection index Nφ(tj), see Algorithm 1
for details.
4. Draw Nφ − t curve for each feeder in a series of time T ′.
5. Calculate the p value for each data point of Nˆφ in Equation (15).
6. Assess the feeder’s operational risk level by comparing the calculated
p value with the interval of α
2
defined in Table I.
The operational risk assessment approach proposed is driven
by the online monitoring data and based on adversarial feature
learning theory. Step 1 is conducted for the formulation of a
spatio-temporal data matrix for each feeder. In Step 2, the
data matrix is partitioned into a series of data segments by
using a moving window method. Step 3 is the adversarial
feature learning process for each data segment, in which no
assumptions or simplifications are made for the underlying
structure of the real data. Step 4∼6 are conducted for the
operational risk assessment based on the central limit theorem.
The proposed approach is practical for online analysis when
the last sampling time is considered as the current time.
IV. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we validate the effectiveness of the proposed
approach and compare it with other existing approaches. Six
cases in different scenarios are designed. The first three cases,
using the synthetic data generated from IEEE 118-bus test
system, test the performances of the proposed approach with
different parameter settings, which offer parameter selection
guidelines for analyzing the real data. The last three cases,
using the real-world online monitoring data, validate the pro-
posed approach and compare it with other existing approaches.
A. Case Study with Synthetic Data
The synthetic data was sampled from the simulation results
of the IEEE 118-bus test system [19]. In the simulations, a
sudden change of the active load at one bus was considered
as an anomaly signal and a little white noise was introduced
to represent random fluctuations.
1) Case Study on z−sampling Distribution: In BiGANs, z
represents the input data of the generative model G, which
6TABLE II
AN ASSUMED SIGNAL FOR ACTIVE LOAD OF BUS 20 IN CASE 1.
Bus Sampling Time Active Load(MW)
20
ts = 1 ∼ 250 20
ts = 251 ∼ 255 120
ts = 256 ∼ 500 20
Others ts = 1 ∼ 500 Unchanged
Fig. 4. The anomaly detection results with different z−sampling distribution.
is sampled from a simple distribution, such as uniform dis-
tribution, gaussian distribution, exponential distribution, etc.
In this case, we will explore whether z−sampling distribution
affects the proposed approach’s performance. The synthetic
data set contained 118 voltage measurements for sampling
500 times. An assumed step signal was set for bus 20 during
ts = 251 ∼ 255 and others stayed unchanged, which was
shown in Table II. The other involved parameters were set as
follows:
– The moving window’s size P ×Nw: 118× 10;
– The moving step size Ns: 10;
– The number of layers for D/E/G: 5;
– The number of neurons in each hidden layer of D:
768, 320, 256;
– The number of neurons in each hidden layer of E:
768, 320, 256;
– The number of neurons in each hidden layer of G:
256, 320, 768;
– The feature size: 64;
– The number of steps m applied to D: 1;
– The number of iterations n to calculate Vavg(D,E,G): 10;
– The initial learning rate η: 0.0002;
– The slope of the leak β in LReLu: 0.2;
– The dropout coefficient: 0.1;
– The required approximation error ε: 0.0001;
– The test function φ(λ): −λln(λ).
For exploring the effect of z−sampling distribution on the
performance of the proposed approach, the statistical indices
with z sampled from uniform distribution (i.e., z ∼ U(0, 1)),
gaussian distribution (i.e., z ∼ N(0, 1)) and exponential
distribution (i.e., z ∼ E(1)) were respectively calculated
and the corresponding Nφ − t curves were plotted in Fig-
ure 4. It can be observed that the assumed anomaly signal
can be detected when z is sampled from any distribution.
Meanwhile, for the Nφ − t curves, the p values of Nˆφ
Fig. 5. The shape of sampling distribution of the standardized anomaly indices
with different z−sampling distribution.
Fig. 6. The anomaly detection results with different model depth.
corresponding to the anomaly point were calculated, results
of which were 0.0005%, 0.0005%, 0.0005%, respectively.
It can be concluded that the detection performance of the
proposed approach is almost not affected by the assumption
of z−sampling distribution.
In the experiment, the synthetic data set were partitioned
into 50 data segments and Nφ,l(l = 1, · · · , n = 10) were
generated for each data segment. In order to explore the
shape of the sampling distribution of the anomaly index corre-
sponding to different z−sampling distribution, the probability
density function (PDF) curves of Nˆφ with outliers (the values
corresponding to the anomaly point) dropped are plotted in
Figure 5. It can be observed that the sampling distribution of
Nˆφ is approximately normal when the degrees of freedom are
large, regardless of z−sampling distribution. It validates our
assumption in Section III-B that Nˆφ follows a t distribution.
2) Case Study on Model Depth: Since D,E and G in
BiGANs are composed of multi-layer network, in this case, we
will explore how the model depth (i.e., the number of layers
in D/E/G) affects the proposed approach’s performance. The
generated data set in Case 1) was used in this case, and z was
sampled from standard gaussian distribution, i.e., z ∼ N(0, 1).
The other involved parameters were set the same as in Case 1).
For illustrating the effect of model depth on the performance
of the proposed approach, the anomaly indices corresponding
to different model depth were calculated and normalized into
[0, 1], which was shown in Figure 6.
It can be observed that the assumed anomaly signal can be
detected for different model depth (i.e., depth = 3, 4, 5, 6).
Meanwhile, for the Nφ − t curves, the p values of Nˆφ
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Fig. 7. The convergence rate of training BiGANs with different model depth.
The maximum number of iterations are set to be 100000. It can be observed
that, with the increase of model depth, the number of iterations to converge
for training BiGANs become less.
Fig. 8. The anomaly detection results corresponding to different feature size.
corresponding to the anomaly point were calculated, results of
which were 0.1815%, 0.0005%, 0.0005%, 0.0030%, respec-
tively. It shows that the best anomaly detection performance
is achieved when the model depth is 4 or 5. Furthermore, the
effect of model depth on the convergence rate in training Bi-
GANs is illustrated in Figure 7. Considering the performance
and efficiency comprehensively, the model depth is set as 5 in
the subsequent experiments.
3) Case Study on Feature Size: In this case, the effect of
feature size on the performance of the proposed approach is
explored. The generated data set in case 1) was used in this
case, and the model depth was set to be 5. The other involved
parameters were set the same as in Case 1). The anomaly
indices corresponding to different feature size were calculated
and normalized into [0, 1], which was shown in Figure 8.
It can be observed that the assumed anomaly signal
can be detected for different feature size (i.e., size =
20, 40, 60, 80, 100). For the Nφ − t curve, the p values of Nˆφ
corresponding to the anomaly point were calculated and the re-
sults were 0.0010%, 0.0005%, 0.0005%, 0.0005%, 0.0115%,
respectively. It can be concluded that: 1) when the feature
size is small (such as 20 or 40), the proposed approach is
sensitive to the anomaly signal, but it is vulnerable to random
fluctuations; 2) with the increase of feature size, the proposed
approach becomes less sensitive to the anomaly signal and
more robust to random fluctuations. In the experiment, we
note that large feature size will lead to a slow convergence
rate in training BiGANs. Therefore, a moderate feature size is
often selected empirically.
B. Case Study on Real-World Online Monitoring Data
In this section, the online monitoring data obtained from
a distribution network in Hangzhou city of China is used
to validate the proposed approach. The distribution network
contains 200 feeder lines with 8000 distribution transformers.
The online monitoring data were sampled every 15 minutes.
Anomaly time and type for each feeder line were recorded
during the operation. In the following cases, three-phase volt-
ages were chosen as the measurement variables to formulate
the data matrices. Voltage violation and disturbance were
considered as the risk items.
1) Case Study on Voltage Violation: Voltage violation is
an common anomaly type in distribution networks, which
increases the operational risks of the networks. It contains
two aspects, i.e., exceeding the upper limit or the lower
limit. In this case, we assess the operational risk of one
feeder line suffering from voltage violation to validate the
proposed approach. The feeder, with branch lines and sub-
stations, contained 15 distribution transformers in total. The
online monitoring data were sampled from 2017/3/1 00:00:00
to 2017/3/14 23:45:00, thus a 45 × 1344 data matrix was
formulated. The data with anomaly time and type labelled are
shown in Figure 9. The involved parameters are set as follows:
– the moving window’s size P ×Nw: 45× 96;
– the moving step size Ns: 96;
– the model depth: 5;
– the number of neurons in each hidden layer of D:
1660, 960, 320;
– the number of neurons in each hidden layer of E:
1660, 960, 320;
– the number of neurons in each hidden layer of G:
320, 960, 1660;
– the feature size: 64;
– the number of steps m applied to D: 1;
– the number of iterations n to calculate Vavg(D,E,G): 5;
– the initial learning rate η: 0.0001;
– the slope of the leak β in LReLu: 0.2;
– the dropout coefficient: 0.2;
– the required approximation error ε: 0.0001;
– the test function φ(λ): −λln(λ).
Figure 10 shows the anomaly detection results when z
is sampled from uniform distribution, gaussian distribution,
exponential distribution, respectively. From the Nφ− t curves,
we can obtain:
I. The value of Nφ on March 13th is significantly smaller
than those on other days, which indicates anomaly occurred on
March 13th. The PDFs of the extracted features corresponding
to March 13th and other days (such as March 1st) are shown in
Figure 11. It can be observed that the PDFs of the extracted
features are different when the feeder operates in different
8Fig. 9. The real-world online monitoring data with anomaly time and type
labelled. The anomaly time is 2017/3/13 18:00:00 and the anomaly type is
voltage violation.
Fig. 10. The Nφ − t curve in voltage violation detection.
(a) March 13th (b) March 1st
Fig. 11. The PDF of the extracted features corresponding to abnormal and
normal operating states of the feeder line.
states, i.e., the PDF of the extracted features in normal
operating state is more centered.
II. The p values of Nˆφ corresponding to the anomaly time
for different z−sampling distribution were calculated, results
of which were 0.1850%, 0.2005%, 0.2195%, respectively. It
validates the performance of the proposed approach is almost
not affected by the assumption z−sampling distribution.
III. The calculated p values of Nˆφ on March 13th are smaller
than α2 =
1−97.5%
2 = 1.25%, which indicates the feeder
operates in emergency state and it needs to be further analyzed.
2) Case Study on Voltage Disturbance: Voltage disturbance
is an complex anomaly type in distribution networks, which
is random in magnitude and could involve sporadic bursts
as well. It may be caused by short circuit fault, sudden
Fig. 12. The real-world online monitoring data with anomaly time and type
labelled. The anomaly time is 2017/3/9 04:08:00 and the anomaly type is
voltage disturbance.
Fig. 13. The Nφ − t curve in voltage disturbance detection.
load change, or connection of distribution generation, etc.
In this case, the performance of the proposed approach is
tested by assessing the operational risk of one feeder line
suffering from voltage disturbance. The feeder contained 7
distribution transformers and the online monitoring data were
sampled during 2017/3/1 00:00:00 ∼ 2017/3/14 23:45:00, thus
a 21×1344 data matrix was formulated. The data with anomaly
time and type labelled are shown in Figure 12. The moving
window’s size was 21 × 96, the number of neurons in each
hidden layer of D/E were 1120, 672, 256, and the number of
neurons in each hidden layer of G were 256, 672, 1120. The
other parameters were set the same as in the above case.
Figure 13 shows the anomaly detection results correspond-
ing to different z−sampling distributions. From the Nφ − t
curves, we can obtain:
I. The value of Nφ on March 9th is smaller than those on
other days, which indicates the latent anomaly is accurately
detected. The PDFs of the extracted features corresponding
to abnormal and normal feeder operating states are shown in
Figure 14. It can be observed that, the PDF of the extracted
features in normal operating state is more centered.
II. For each Nφ − t curve, the p values corresponding
to the anomaly time were calculated, results of which were
0.235%, 0.196%, 0.353%, respectively. It also validates the
performance of the proposed approach is almost not affected
by the assumption of z−sampling distribution.
III. The calculated p values of Nˆφ on March 9th is smaller
9(a) March 9th (b) March 1st
Fig. 14. The PDF of the extracted features corresponding to abnormal and
normal operating states of the feeder line.
than α2 = 1.25%, which indicates the feeder operates in
emergency state and it deserves to be further analyzed.
3) Comparison with Other Existing Approaches: We further
compare the proposed approach with other existing approaches
in accuracy and efficiency by assessing the operational risks
of feeder lines suffering from anomalies. Here, the risk levels
in Table I are simplified as abnormal (emergency state) and
normal (the other states). Anomaly detection techniques based
on deep autoencoders (DAE) [20][21], principal component
analysis (PCA) [2], spectrum analysis (SPA) [18], or threshold
analysis (THA) [22] have been well studied. In order to
make a full comparison with the other existing techniques,
we analyzed 180 feeder lines with 250 anomaly records
during 2017/3/1 00:00:00 ∼ 2017/4/30 23:45:00. Here, voltage
violation and fluctuation were considered as anomaly items.
For DAE, PCA, and SPA, the moving window’s size was
P ×96, the moving step size was 96 and the test function was
φ(λ) = −λln(λ). For THA, the anomaly index was defined
as
P (A) =
n(A)∑
j=1
t(A)j
T ′
, (17)
where T ′ is the total number of sampling times, t(A)j is the
duration for each abnormal state (i.e., the voltage exceeds the
upper or lower limit), n(A) is the number of abnormal states,
and P (A) ∈ [0, 1]. In the experiments, the optimal parameters
involved in each detection approach were tested, and they were
set as in Table III.
In order to compare the detection performances of dif-
ferent approaches, true detection rate (TDR) and
false alarm rate (FAR) are used to measure the perfor-
mance of each method. The TDR and FAR are defined as
TDR =
Ncr
Ngt
FAR =
Nal −Ncr
Nal
, (18)
where Ncr is the number of anomalies that are correctly
detected, Ngt denotes the number of ground-truth anoma-
lies, and Nal is the number of all detected alarms. The
higher the TDR and the smaller the FAR, the better de-
tection performance of one approach. Meanwhile, in or-
der to compare the efficiency of different approaches, the
average calculation time (ACT ) for each 96 sampling
times (i.e., the moving window’s width) was counted. The
TABLE III
PARAMETER SETTINGS INVOLVED IN THE DETECTION APPROACHES.
Approaches Parameter Settings
BiGANs
the model depth: 5;
the number of neurons in each hidden layer of D:
b{0.5, 0.3, 0.1} × P × 96c;
the number of neurons in each hidden layer of E:
b{0.5, 0.3, 0.1} × P × 96c;
the number of neurons in each hidden layer of G:
b{0.1, 0.3, 0.5} × P × 96c;
the feature size: b{0.03 ∼ 0.05} × P × 96c;
the number of steps m applied to D: 1;
the number of iterations n to calculate
Vavg(D,E,G): 5;
the initial learning rate η: 0.0001;
the slope of the leak β in LReLu: 0.2;
the dropout coefficient: 0.1;
the required approximation error ε: 0.0001;
DAE
the model depth: 4;
the number of neurons in each hidden layer of
encoder: b{0.6, 0.3} × P × 96c;
the number of neurons in each hidden layer of
decoder: b{0.3, 0.6} × P × 96c;
the feature size: b0.1× P × 96c;
the initial learning rate: 0.001;
the activation function: sigmoid;
the minimum reconstruction error: 0.00001;
the optimizer: Adam.
PCA the contribution rate of top k eigenvalues: 0.95.
SPA the signal-noise-ratio: 500.
THA
the lower limit of voltage violation: 0.93;
the upper limit of voltage violation: 1.07;
the anomaly threshold Pth: 0.001.
TABLE IV
COMPARISON RESULTS OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES.
Methods TDR(%) FAR(%) ACT (s)
BiGANs 76.80 13.90 4.235
DAE 69.60 30.95 1.856
PCA 53.60 23.86 0.587
SPA 56.40 35.02 0.790
THA 42.80 29.17 0.314
experiments were conducted on a server with 2.60 GHz central
processing unit (CPU) and 8.00 GB random access memory
(RAM). The comparison results are shown in Table IV.
It can be observed that the proposed BiGANs-based ap-
proach has the highest TDR and the smallest FAR, which
indicates it outperforms DAE, PCA, SPA and THA in anomaly
detection performance. The reasons are:
• THA uses the simple statistical features that often are not
well generalized, which makes it impossible to detect the
latent anomalies.
• SPA makes an assumption that the input data follows a
certain distribution and the entries of the data matrix are
independently and identically distributed. Besides, SPA
is an anomaly detection approach based on correlation
analysis, which is not sensitive to the amplitude variation
of the data.
• PCA is a linear dimension reduction approach and the
optimal parameter measuring the contribution rate of top
k eigenvalues is hard to find for all data segments.
• DAE is a nonlinear generalization of PCA and it is
vulnerable to the random fluctuations for the reason of
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simple network structure and learning algorithm.
The proposed approach overcomes the shortcomings of
the other existing approaches by using complex D,E,G to
learn the features of the input data in an adversarial way.
Meanwhile, it is noted that the proposed approach has the
highest ACT (i.e., 4.235s) for the reason of complex network
structure and learning algorithm, which indicates the worst
detection efficiency compared with the other approaches. How-
ever, considering the online monitoring data in the researched
network is sampled every 15 minutes, the proposed approach
is practical for the online operational risk analysis. Moreover,
with the development of graphics processing unit (GPU)
and field-programmable gate array (FPGA) techniques, the
computational efficiency will be improved greatly.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a new unsupervised approach to realize
the operational risk assessment in distribution networks. The
proposed approach is capable of mining the hidden structure of
the real data and automatically learning the most representative
features of the data in an adversarial way. By analyzing the
distribution of the extracted features, a statistical index is
calculated to indicate the data behavior. The standard form
of the index is experimentally proved to approximate the t
distribution. Furthermore, the operational risks of feeders are
divided into emergency, high risk, preventive and normal by
the defined intervals of the confidence level for the population
mean of the standardized index, which makes it possible for
the quantitative risk assessment.
Cases on the synthetic data offer guidelines for the param-
eter selections of the proposed approach, including simple
z−sampling distribution, moderate model depth and feature
size. Cases on the real-world online monitoring data indicate
the proposed approach can improve the risk assessment accu-
racy a lot compared with the other existing techniques. How-
ever, the computational burden is increased for the complex
network structure and learning algorithm of the approach. In
view of the outstanding advantages in assessment performance,
the proposed approach can serve as a primitive for analyzing
the spatio-temporal data in distribution networks.
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